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2.1  Introduction 
After a hiatus of over two decades, scholarly attention has returned to theo- 
retical and empirical analyses of economic growth and development. Recent 
contributions, variously described as “endogenous” growth theory and “new” 
growth theory, have included many of the factors that have long been viewed 
as contributing to growth and development in an analytically coherent frame- 
work. Such features as significant scale economies, pervasive externalities 
(particularly in the generation and diffusion of technological knowledge), and 
the accumulation of human capital have been incorporated, not as some exoge- 
nous deus ex machina for generating growth, but as processes interacting with, 
if not also generated by, the behavior of producers, consumers, and the govern- 
ment. Renewed interest in empirically testing some of the implications of theo- 
ries and estimating the contributions to growth of various factors has also been 
stimulated by  these  contributions. Interestingly,  the  revival  of  interest  in 
growth theory came soon after developments in  the theory of  international 
trade, which also grounded scale economies and the generation of technologi- 
cal knowledge in the rational behavior of agents operating in necessarily im- 
perfectly competitive markets. For this reason, recent models of  growth and 
trade not only have recognizable analytical similarities, but also more im- 
portantly, shed light on related issues in theory, empirics, and policy. Let me 
illustrate with just one among many possible examples. 
In the context of the long-run effects of variations in saving and investment 
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rates, an important theoretical question is, Does an increase in the rate of in- 
vestment (leaving aside for the moment the question of  whether the rate is 
exogenous or endogenous) have only a level effect, i.e., it changes only the 
long-run level of outputper worker; or does it also have a growth effect, i.e., it 
changes the long-run rate of growth of outputper worker? An analogous theo- 
retical question in the context of  international trade is, Does opening up a 
closed economy to foreign trade have only a level effect (i.e., yield only static 
and once and for  all gains from trade) or does it also have a growth effect (i.e., 
yield dynamic gains from trade as well)? In the context of finance, the issue is, 
Does the relaxation of financial repression generate largely static gains or does 
the functioning of financial institutions have a key role in the growth process? 
A related empirical question is the following: Does the evidence-either 
from a long time series for individual entities such as regions, countries, or 
subregions within countries or from a cross section of  entities at different 
points of time-confirm,  for example, that variations in factor accumulation 
have, in effect, only level effects? This is the implication of  a neoclassical 
model in which all entities have access to the same constant-returns-to-scale 
production function with the marginal product of  any factor diminishing to 
zero as its use is increased indefinitely relative to other factors. That is, loosely 
speakmg, regardless of  their differences with respect to accumulation, do all 
entities grow in the long run at a rate determined by  the rate of  growth of 
exogenous factors such as its labor force and technical progress? An interesting 
empirical-cum-policy issue is whether orientation toward foreign trade is at 
the heart of the spectacular growth performance of East Asian economies and 
their Southeast Asian followers, and, by the same token, whether the poor per- 
formance of  some of their South Asian neighbors is explained by  excessive 
inward orientation? Put another way,  does openness to  trade generate dy- 
namic gains? 
The theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented literature on long-run growth 
and trade has grown by leaps and bounds since its revival by Lucas (1988) and 
Romer (1986). The recent literature on international trade, innovations, and 
growth, initiated by Grossman and Helpman (1990), is well covered in their 
later monograph (Grossman and Helpman 1991). I do not propose to survey 
these literatures. Instead, in section 2.2, by placing some of the recent theoreti- 
cal models in juxtaposition with the earlier growth models, I argue that it is 
misleading to characterize the earlier models as necessarily implying that sus- 
tained growth in per capita income is impossible in the absence of exogenous 
technical progress and to suggest that, in contrast, recent models generate such 
growth by endogenizing the growth process including that of technical change. 
On the contrary, sustained growth is possible in the former even in the absence 
of technical progress as long as the marginal product of an accumulable factor 
of production (such as capital) has a positive lower bound, regardless of how 
much it is accumulated relative to other factors. While it is true that in recent 
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that, in some, multiple steady states are possible, these features were also pres- 
ent in some of the earlier models. Also, increasing, rather than constant, returns 
to scale, which are characteristic of  some of the recent models, are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to generate sustained growth. Section 2.2 also briefly 
describes a growth model due to Raut and Srinivasan (1991) with endogenous 
fertility and externalities to population density, where nonlinear dynamics gen- 
erates a plethora of outcomes (depending on the functional forms, parameters, 
and initial conditions) that include not only the neoclassical steady state with 
exponential growth of  population with constant per capita income and con- 
sumption, but also growth paths which do not converge to a steady state and 
are even chaotic. Per capita output grows exponentially (and superexponen- 
tially) in some of the examples. 
In section 2.3 I briefly and selectively review the recent empirical literature 
on  growth, focusing attention in particular on  the serious inadequacies of 
cross-country studies from the perspective of the specification of the model to 
be estimated, the techniques of estimation, and  above all the database used for 
estimation. Section 2.4 concludes the paper with a few remarks on the findings 
from the recent growth literature and their policy implications, if any.’ 
2.2  Growth Theories: Past and Present 
Theorizing about long-run growth revived after a hiatus of over two decades 
since the last spurt in the 1950s and 1960s. The latter was itself inspired by 
much earlier and pioneering works of Frank Ramsey (1  928) on optimal saving 
and of von Neumann (1945) on balanced growth at a maximal rate, and also 
by dynamic extensions of the Keynesian model by Harrod (1939) and later by 
Domar (1947). In the largely neoclassical growth-theoretic literature of  the 
1960s and earlier, one could distinguish three strands. 
The first strand is positive or, better still, descriptive theory aimed at ex- 
plaining the stylized facts of long-run growth in industrialized countries (par- 
ticularly in the United States), such as the steady secular growth of aggregate 
output and the relative constancy of  the share of  savings, investment, labor, 
and capital income in aggregate output. These stylized facts themselves had 
been established by  the works of  empirically oriented economists, such as 
Abramovitz (1956), Denison (1962), and Kuznets (1966), who were mainly 
interested in accounting for observed growth. Solow’s (1956, 1957)  celebrated 
articles and later work by Jorgenson and Griliches (1966) and others are ex- 
amples of  descriptive growth theory and related empirical analysis. Uzawa 
(1961, 1963) extended Solow’s descriptive one-sector model into a two-sector 
model. As Stiglitz (1990) remarked, by showing that the long-run steady state 
growth rate could be unaffected by  the rate of  savings (and investment) and 
that, even in the short run, the rate of  growth was  mostly accounted for by 
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the rate of  labor-augmenting technical progress, Solow challenged the then- 
conventional wisdom. 
The second strand is normative theory, which drew  its  inspiration from 
Ramsey’s (1928) classic paper on optimal saving. In contrast to the descriptive 
models in which the aggregate savings rate was exogenously specified (usually 
as a constant over time), the normative models derived time-varying savings 
rates from the optimization of an intertemporal social welfare function. There 
were mainly two variants of such normative models: one-sector models (e.g., 
Koopmans 1965; Cass 1965) and two-sector models (Srinivasan 1962, 1964; 
Uzawa 1964). The contribution of Phelps (1961) is also normative, but it fo- 
cused only on the steady state level of consumption per worker, rather than on 
the entire transitional time path to the steady state, and solved for that savings 
rate which maximized the steady state level of consumption per worker. 
The third  strand of  theory  is neither primarily  descriptive nor primarily 
normative, though  it  is related to both. Harrod’s dynamic extension of  the 
Keynesian model (with its constant marginal propensity to save) raised the 
issue of stability of the growth path by contrasting two growth rates: the war- 
runted rate of growth that would be consistent with maintaining the savings- 
investment equilibrium and the  natural  growth  rate  as determined by  the 
growth of the labor force and technical change. In this model, unless the econo- 
my’s behavioral and technical parameters keep it on the knife edge of equality 
between warranted and natural growth rates, there would be either growing 
underutilization of  capacity if  the warranted rate exceeds the natural rate or 
growing unemployment if the natural rate exceeds the warranted rate. Indeed 
this knife-edge property resulting from Harrod’s assumption that capital and 
labor are used in fixed proportions led Solow to look for growth paths converg- 
ing to a steady state by replacing Harrod’s technology with a neoclassical tech- 
nology of positive elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. 
Von  Neumann’s (1945) model is also part of the third strand. In this model 
production technology is characterized by  a finite set of constant-returns-to- 
scale activities with inputs being committed at the beginning of each discrete 
production period and outputs emerging at the end. There are no nonproduced 
factors of  production such as labor or exhaustible natural resources. In  the 
“primal” version, von Neumann characterized the vector of activity levels that 
permitted the maximal rate of balanced growth (i.e., growth in which outputs 
of all commodities grew at the same rate) given that the outputs of each period 
were to be ploughed back as inputs in the next period. In the “dual” version, a 
vector of commodity prices and an interest rate were derived which had the 
properties that the value of output of each activity was no higher than the value 
of inputs inclusive of interest and that the interest rate was the lowest possible. 
Under certain assumptions about the technology, von Neumann showed, first, 
that the maximal growth rate of output of the primal version was equal to the 
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slackness relations obtained between the vector  of  activity levels, prices, 
growth, and interest rates. 
Although prima facie there is no normative rationale for balanced growth 
and the maximization of the growth rate, particularly in a setup with no final 
consumption of any good, it turned out that the von Neumann path of balanced 
growth at the maximal rate has a “normative” property. As Dorfman, Sam- 
uelson,  and  Solow (1958) conjectured and  Radner (1961) later rigorously 
proved, given an objective that is a function only of  the terminal stocks of 
commodities, the path starting from a given initial vector of stocks that maxi- 
mizes this objective will be “close” to the von Neumann path “most” of  the 
time, as long as the terminal date is sufficiently distant from the initial date, 
regardless of the initial stocks and of the form of the objective function. This 
“turnpike” feature was later seen in other growth models in which final con- 
sumption is allowed and production involves the use of nonproduced factors. 
For example, in the Koopmans-Cass model, in which the objective is to max- 
imize the discounted sum of the stream of utility of per capita consumption 
over time, a unique steady state exists which is defined by the discount rate, 
the rate of  growth of  the labor force, and the technology of  production. All 
optimal paths, i.e., paths that maximize the objective function and start from 
different initial conditions, converge to this steady state regardless of the func- 
tional form of the utility function. As such, all optimal paths stay “close” to 
the steady state path “most” of the time. 
Barring a few exceptions to be noted below, in the neoclassical growth mod- 
els production technology was assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and 
in many, though not all models, smooth substitution among inputs with strictly 
diminishing marginal rates of  substitution between any two inputs along an 
isoquant was also posited. Analytical attention was focused on conditions en- 
suring the existence and uniqueness of steady state growth paths along which 
all inputs and outputs grew at the same rate-the  steady state being the path 
to which all transitional paths starting from any given initial conditions and 
satisfying the requirements of specified descriptive rates of accumulation or of 
intertemporal welfare optimality converged. The steady state growth rate was 
the exogenous  rate of growth of the labor force in efficiency units, so that in 
the absence of  (exogenous) labor-augmenting technical progress, output per 
worker was constant along the steady state. 
Turning to the exceptions, Solow (1956) himself drew attention to the possi- 
bility that a steady state need not even exist and that even if one existed it need 
not be unique. Indeed output per worker could grow indefinitely, even in the 
absence of  labor-augmenting technical progress, if  the marginal product of 
capital were bounded below by a sufficiently high positive number. Helpman 
(1992) also draws attention to this. Also, there could be multiple steady states, 
some of which are unstable, if the production technology exhibits nonconvexi- 
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There were also exceptions to the exogeneity of technical progress and of 
the rate of growth of output along a steady state. In the one-sector, one-factor 
models of Harrod and Domar and the two-sector models of Fel’dman (1928, 
as described in Domar 1957) and Mahalanobis (1955), marginal capital-output 
ratios were assumed to be constant so that by definition the marginal product 
of capital did not decline. The growth rate was endogenous and depended on 
the rate of savings (investment) in such one-sector models and on the aggregate 
rate of  investment and its allocation between sectors producing capital and 
consumer goods in the two-sector models. Kaldor and Mirrlees (1962) endo- 
genized technical progress (and hence the rate of growth of output) by relating 
productivity of  workers operating newly produced equipment to the rate of 
growth of investment per worker. And there was the celebrated model of Arrow 
(1962) of “learning by doing,” in which factor productivity was an increasing 
function of  cumulated output or investment. Uzawa (1965) also endogenized 
technical progress by postulating that the rate of growth of labor-augmenting 
technical progress was a concave function of the ratio of labor employed in the 
education sector to total employment. The education sector was assumed to 
use labor as the only input. Uzawa’s model has influenced recent contributions 
to growth theory. In addition, in the literature on induced innovation (Ahmad 
1966; Boserup 1965; Kennedy 1964) technical change was, by definition, en- 
dogenous. 
The recent revival of  growth theory started with the influential papers of 
Lucas (1988) and Romer (1986). Lucas motivated his approach by arguing that 
neoclassical growth theory cannot account for observed differences in growth 
across countries and over time and for its evidently counterfactual prediction 
that  international trade should induce rapid movements toward equality in 
capital-labor ratios and factor prices.2  He argued that, “In the absence of differ- 
ences in pure technology then, and under the assumption of no factor mobility, 
the neoclassical model predicts a  strong tendency to income equality and 
equality in growth rates, tendencies we can observe within countries and, per- 
haps, within the wealthiest countries taken as a group, but which simply cannot 
be seen in the world at large. When factor mobility is permitted, this prediction 
is powerfully reinforced” (Lucas 1988, 15-16).  He then goes on to suggest 
that the one factor isolated by the neoclassical model, namely, variation across 
countries in technology, “has the potential to account for wide differences in 
income levels and growth rates. . . . When we talk about differences in ‘tech- 
nology’ across countries we are not talking about knowledge in general, but 
about the knowledge of particular people, or particular subcultures of people. 
If so, then while it is not exactly wrong to describe these differences [as] exog- 
enous . . . neither is it useful to do so. We  want a formalism that leads us to 
think about individual decisions to acquire knowledge, and about the conse- 
2. In fact, besides introducing the constant elasticity of substitution production function, Arrow 
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quences of these decisions for productivity.” He draws on the theory of “human 
capital” to provide such a formalism: each individual acquires productivity- 
enhancing skills by  devoting time to such acquisition and away from paying 
work. The acquisition of skills by a worker not only increases her productivity 
but, by increasing the average level of skills in the economy as a whole, has a 
spillover effect on the productivity of  all workers by increasing the average 
level of skills in the economy as a whole. 
Romer also looked for an alternative to the neoclassical model of long-run 
growth to escape from its implications that “initial conditions or current distur- 
bances have no long-run effect on the level of output and consumption. . .  .  In 
the absence of technical change, per capita output should converge to a steady- 
state value with no per capita growth” (Romer 1986, 1002-3). His is “an equi- 
librium model of endogenous technological change in which long-run growth 
is driven primarily by the accumulation of  knowledge by  forward-looking, 
profit-maximizing agents” (1003). While the production of new knowledge is 
through a technology that exhibits diminishing returns, “the creation of new 
knowledge by  one firm is assumed to have a positive external effect on the 
production possibilities of other firms . . . [so that] production of consumption 
goods as a function of  stock of knowledge exhibits increasing returns; more 
precisely, knowledge may have an increasing marginal product” (1003). 
It should be noted that the spillover effect of  the average stock of human 
capital per worker in the Lucas model and of  knowledge in the Romer model 
are externalities unperceived (and hence not internalized) by individual agents. 
However, for the economy as a whole they generate increasing scale econo- 
mies even though the perceived production function of  each agent exhibits 
constant returns to scale. Thus by introducing nonconvexities through the de- 
vice of  a Marshallian externality Lucas and Romer were able to work with an 
intertemporal competitive (albeit a  socially nonoptimal) equilibrium. Thus 
both avoid facing the problem3 that research and development (R&D) efforts 
that  lead  to  technical progress  are  “naturally associated with  imperfectly 
competitive markets, as Schumpeter (1942) had forcefully argued” (Stiglitz 
1990, 25). Later work by  others (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991) form- 
ulated models in which firms operating in imperfectly competitive markets 
undertook R&D. 
In sorting out the differences between neoclassical and recent growth mod- 
els it is useful to start with Solow’s growth model. Solow assumes an aggregate 
production function, 
where Y,  is aggregate output at time t, K,  is the stock of capital, L, is labor hours 
at time t, and A, (A,, = 1) is the disembodied technology factor (i.e., index of 
total factor productivity), so that output at time t associated with any combina- 
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tion of capital stock and labor input in efficiency units is A, times the output at 
time zero associated with the same combination. Analogously, 6,  (with b, = 1) 
is the efficiency level of a unit of  labor in period t, so that a unit of  labor at 
time t is equivalent to b, units of labor at time zero. Thus the technical progress 
induced by increases in 6,  is labor augmenting. It is easily seen that technical 
progress through A, is Hicks neutral, and that through 6,  is Harrod neutral. 
Let kr = K,/b,L,, the ratio of capital to labor in efficiency units in period t, 
let k, =  K,/L,, the ratio of capital to labor in natural units, and let y, = Y,/b,L,, 
the level of output or income per unit of labor in efficiency units. Solow made 
the following crucial assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION  1 (Neoclassical). F is homogeneous of degree one in its ar- 
guments and concave. 
Given assumption 1, the average product of  an efficiency unit of labor, i.e., 
(l/b,LJF(k,,  b,L,),  equals F(k,, 1).  LetfTk,) = F(k,, 1). Clearly, concavity of F 
implies concavity off as a function of  k,. In fact, f  is assumed to be strictly 
concave withfT0) = 0. 
ASSUMPTION  2 (Inada). 
limf’(k) = 00  and  limf’(k) = 0. 
f+O  L+== 
In a closed economy, assuming that labor is growing exogenously as L, = 
(1 + n)‘L,,  human capital or skill level is growing exogenously as b, = (1 + 
b),,  capital is depreciating at the rate S per period, and denoting by c, the level 
of consumption per efficiency unit of labor, we have 
AJk,)  + (1 -  S)kr -  C,  ___ 
(1 + n)(1  + b) 
’  ‘r+,  = 
Solow further assumed that the savings rate is constant, i.e., c, = (1 -  s)y,. 
Then equation (2) becomes 
(3) 
sA,fTkJ + (1 -  S)k, - 
= g(Q.  (1 + n)  (1 + b) 
‘,+I  = 
Equation (3) is the fundamental difference equation of the Solow model. If 
there is no disembodied technical progress, so that A, = 1 for all t,  then the 
phase diagram of the dynamic system can be represented as in figure 2.1. It is 
clear from figure 2.1 that, starting from any arbitrary initial capital-labor ratio 
k,,  the economy will converge (ignoring the inessential problem due to dis- 
creteness of time) to the steady state k*, defined by g(k*) = k*, in which all 
the per capita variables, including per capita income, will grow at the rate b. 
Thus if b = 0, per capita income, consumption, and savings do not grow along 
the steady state. Further, policies that permanently affect the savings rate, or 
fertility rate, will have no long-run growth effects. 
It is clear from figure 2.1, however, that out of the steady state (i.e., in the 
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technological change. The rate of  growth will depend on the initial capital- 
labor ratio and the time period over which the average growth rate is calculated. 
It can be shown that the average growth rate decreases as the initial capital- 
labor ratio ko (and hence initial income per head) increases.  As the initial 
capital-labor ratio tends to k*,  the average growth rate of per capita income 
converges to 6, the exogenously given rate of labor-augmenting technical prog- 
ress. This is indeed one of  the convergence hypotheses that are tested in the 
recent empirical literature on growth. Policies that affect s and n clearly affect 
growth rates out of the steady state. However, the effects of changes in s and n 
on the growth rate of per capita income are only temporary, and the marginal 
product of capital will be declining over time. It should be noted, however, that 
this predicted fall in the marginal product of capital is not observed, for ex- 
ample, in U.S. historical data. 
It is also clear that per capita output can grow indefinitely even in traditional 
growth models if the marginal product of capital is bounded away from zero 
as the capital-labor ratio grows indefinitely. Thus the standard neoclassical as- 
sumption that the marginal product of capital is a strictly decreasing function 
of the capital-labor  ratio is not inconsistent  with indefinite growth of per capita 
output. It has to diminish to zero as the capital-labor  ratio increases indefinitely 
to preclude such growth. This is easily seen from equation (3). 
Consider the simplest version of the neoclassical growth model with b, = 1 
and A, = 1 for all t, so that k, = k,. Letf(0) = 0 and let the marginal product 
of  capital, i.e.,f’(k), be bounded away from (n  + S)/s (i.e., f’(k) >  (n  + S)/s 
for all k). Strict concavity of f(k),  together with f(0) = 0, implies f(k) > 
kf’ (k) >  k(n + S)/s,  so that from equation (3) it follows that k,,, >  k,. This in 
turn implies that output per worker,f(k,), grows at a positive rate at all t. More- 
over, given strict concavity of f(k),  it follows that f’(k)  is monotonically de- 
creasing and, hence, has a limiting value as k -+  w, say, yy,  that is at least as 46  T. N. Srinivasan 
large as (n + 6)/s. As such it can be verified that the asymptotic growth rate of 
output and consumption will be at least as large as [sy, -  (n + S)](l + n)  2 
0. The savings rate, s, can be made endogenous, thus~leading  to a theory of 
endogenous and sustained long-run growth in per capita income. Thus the neo- 
classical framework can endogenously generate long-run growth in per capita 
income. However, the assumption that the marginal product has a positive 
lower bound is not particularly attractive since it implies that labor is not essen- 
tial for prod~ction.~ 
A primary goal of the recently revived growth theory is to build models that 
can generate sustained long-run growth in per capita income. A related objec- 
tive is to ensure that the long-run growth rate of income (and, in fact, the entire 
time path of  income) not only depends on the parameters of  the production 
and utility functions, but also on fiscal policies, foreign trade policies, and 
population policies. In most models of  “new” theory, the primary goal is ac- 
complished through increasing scale economies in aggregate production. The 
resulting nonconvexities lead to multiple equilibria and hysteresis in some 
models so that history (i.e., initial conditions as well as any past shocks experi- 
enced by the economy) and policies have long-term effects. 
In assessing the role of increasing scale economies in growth, it is useful 
to distinguish between generating sustained  growth in output per head and 
endogenizing the rate of  growth. For example, with the production function 
Y = PLb,  where 0 < a, b < 1 and a + b > 1, and the labor force growing 
exogenously at the rate n there exists a unique steady state (regardless of the 
savings rate) in which output grows at the exogenous rate of n(a + b - 1)/ 
1 -  a > 0. Thus increasing scale economies together with a marginal product 
of  capital strictly diminishing to Zero (i.e., 0 <  a < 1)  leads to sustained but 
exogenous growth. On the other hand, constant returns to scale with a marginal 
product of  capital bounded awayfrom zero at a sufficiently high positive num- 
ber leads to endogenous and sustained growth. Thus increasing scale econo- 
mies by themselves need not generate endogenous growth. It is also important 
to distinguish how different types of increasing returns to scale in aggregate 
production arise in various growth models. I consider here only two types: 
locally increasing marginal product of capital and scale economies due to spill- 
over effects. For simplicity assume that in equation (1) L, = 1, A, = 1, and 
b, = 1, for all t 2  0. The first type arises when the marginal product of capital, 
f  ’(k),  first increases with k and then decreases, or more generally whenf’(k)  = 
0 has more than one but a finite number of solutions. 
The second type arises in the models of  Lucas and Romer. Building on the 
works of  Arrow (1962) and Sheshinski (1967), Romer (1986) considers an 
economy in which there are n identical firms; each has a production function 
4.  One can easily prove this as follows: Suppose  Inf  aF =  y >  0. Since Fis  homogeneous 
of degree one, F( 1. LIK) = dF/aK + (UK)(aF/aL)  2  aF/dK > y > 0. Now suppose L +  0, then 
it follows that F(1,O) > 0. 
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of the form & = G(K,,  L,, K), where K, is the stock of knowledge capital or 
R&D capital employed by firm i, K = Z,,K, is the industry level aggregate 
stock of knowledge, and L, is labor or any other inputs. K is assumed to have 
a positive spillover effect on the output of each firm, although the choice of K 
is external to the firm. Romer assumes that, for fixed K, G is homogeneous of 
degree one in other inputs. Supposing that all identical firms choose identical 
inputs, we can write & = G(K,,  L,, nKJ.  Define F(Kj,  L,) =  G(Kj,  Li,  nKJ.  It is 
obvious that F exhibits increasing returns to scale in  the inputs K, and Lj. 
Again, in  addition to these scale economies one needs to assume that the 
asymptotic marginal product of  aggregate capital is positive in order to gen- 
erate endogenous growth. Empirical support for the spillover effect of  R&D 
capital is found in several empirical investigations (see Bernstein and Nadiri 
1989 on Canadian industry data; Jaffe 1986 on the U.S. manufacturing firm- 
level data; Raut 1991b on Indian manufacturing firm-level  data).’ 
Following Uzawa (1963, Lucas (1988) endogenizes Harrod-neutral (i.e., 
labor-augmenting) technological change through a mechanism of human capi- 
tal accumulation. Suppose a worker of period t is endowed with b, of human 
capital, or skill, and one unit of labor. He has to allocate his labor endowment 
between accumulating skills and earning wage income. If he devotes the frac- 
tion 4, of his time in the current production sector and 1 -  4, (where 0 I  4, 
5  1) in the learning sector (such as school or some vocational training pro- 
gram), he can increase his human capital in the next period by 
(4)  b, = b,6(1 -  4,). 
The budget constraint for the representative agent is given by 
(5)  c, + if  = ~(k,,  +,b,> -  (n + 6)k,. 
From equation (5) it is clear that for given c,  and k,, the agent faces a trade-off. 
He can spend more time currently (i.e., choose a larger 4,) in the production 
sector and thus have a larger current consumption or future physical capital, 
or choose a lower 4, and thus have larger  future human capital (i.e., higher bt) 
and hence a largerfuture stream of output. It is clear that he would divide his 
savings between human capital and physical capital in a balanced way  so that 
the marginal product of capital does not fall to zero. Under the further assump- 
tion that the production function is of the Cobb-Douglas form 
where the spillover effect is given by A(b,) =  Ab:, 0 <  p, it can be shown that, 
along the balanced growth path, the capital-labor ratio and hence per capita 
income and consumption will be growing at the rate 
5. However, Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991) do not find any evidence for spillover using the 
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yy=(  1-p  1 
where +! is a constant equal to +. Since yy  is a function of +, which is endoge- 
nously determined, the growth rate of per capita income is endogenously deter- 
mined. 
It should be noted that even if there is no spillover effect, i.e.,  p,  = 0, yy is 
positive, and this of course is the consequence of the assumption that the mar- 
ginal return to time devoted to skill accumulation is constant and not diminish- 
ing. As Lucas himself points out, this is crucial for generating sustained growth 
per capita consumption in the long run. Since the opportunity cost of  time 
spent on skill acquisition is foregone income that could have been used for 
consumption or  accumulation of  physical capital, this  crucial  assumption 
should be viewed as the equivalent of  assuming that the marginal product of 
physical capital is constant as in the Harrod-Domar model. 
The Lucas model is essentially a two-sector growth model. Human capital 
and the process of its accumulation play essentially the same role as the capital 
goods sector in the two-sector model of  Mahalanobis (1955). In this model, 
marginal product of capital in the capital goods sector is constant-an  assump- 
tion that is the equivalent of  Lucas’s crucial assumption about the process of 
human capital accumulation (Srinivasan 1993a).6  The rate of growth of income 
and consumption was endogenously determined in the Mahalanobis model by 
the share of  investment devoted to the accumulation of  capacity to produce 
capital goods. The share (1 -  +J of time devoted to skill acquisition plays an 
analogous role in the Lucas model. 
Linearity of the technology of skill acquisition in the Lucas model is restric- 
tive. It leads to a unique balanced growth solution. However, if  a nonlinear 
(convex) technology is assumed, there could be multiple optimal balanced 
growth paths that are locally stable, as has been shown by Azariadis and Dra- 
Zen  (1990). 
Raut  and  Srinivasan  (1991) present  a  model  that  not  only  endogenizes 
growth and the process of shifts in production possibilities over time (i.e., tech- 
nical change) but also generates richer dynamics than the models of  recent 
growth theory. First, by assuming fertility to be endogenous,’ they preclude the 
possibility of aggregate growth being driven solely by exogenous labor force 
growth in the absence of technical change. Second, by assuming that popula- 
tion density has an external effect (not perceived by individual agents) on the 
6. It is also evident that the absence of long-run growth effects of trade in dynamic versions of 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson-type  models of international trade is again due to their implicitly or 
explicitly precluding the marginal product of capital being bounded away from zero. 
7. There are a number of models in the literature in which the interaction of endogenous fertility 
and productive investment in human capital are analyzed in a growth context. My purpose here is 
not to survey this literature. I refer the interested reader to one of  the very interesting such models 
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production process either through its negative congestion effect or through its 
positive effect in stimulating innovation and technical change, they make the 
change in production possibilities endogenously determined by fertility deci- 
sions of  individual agents. However, unlike the new growth literature, their 
model, which is an extension of Raut (1985, 1991a), is not necessarily geared 
to generating steady states. In fact, the nonlinear dynamics of the model gener- 
ates a plethora of  outcomes (depending on the functional forms, parameters, 
and initial conditions) that include not only the neoclassical steady state with 
exponential growth of  population with constant per capita income and con- 
sumption, but also growth paths which do not converge to a steady state and 
are even chaotic. Per capita output grows exponentially (and superexponen- 
tially) in some of the examples. 
The model draws on the insights of E. Boserup (1981) and J. Simon (1981) 
who, among others, have argued that the growth of population could itself in- 
duce technical change. In the Boserup model, increasing population pressure 
on a fixed or very slowly growing supply of  arable land induces changes in 
methods of  cultivation, not simply through substitution of labor for land by 
choice of  techniques within a known set but, more importantly, through the 
invention of new techniques. Simon also attributes a positive role for increases 
in population density in inducing technical progress. Since having a large pop- 
ulation is not sufficient to generate growth (Romer 1990), it is important to 
examine the mechanism by  which population density influences innovation. 
However, neither of  the two authors provides a complete theory of  induced 
innovation. Raut and Srinivasan do not provide one either; they point out that 
the inducement to innovate will depend largely on the returns and risks to re- 
sources devoted to innovative activity and that there is no particular reason to 
suggest that preexisting relative factor prices or endowments will necessarily 
tilt these returns toward search for technologies that save particular factors. 
They simply analyze the implications of assuming that technical change is in- 
fluenced by population density (strictly speaking, population size) in a world 
where fertility is endogenous. 
More precisely, they assume that technical change in our model economy is 
Hicks neutral and that its rate is determined by  the change in the size of  the 
working population. Thus, instead of  the aggregate production function in 
equation (l), they use the following: 
(8)  Y,  =  A(L,)W,, LJ. 
However, for both consumers and firms in this economy, A&)  is an externality. 
This externality is introduced in a model of overlapping generations in which 
a member of each generation lives for three periods, the first of which is spent 
as a child in the parent’s household. The second period is spent as a young 
person working, having and raising children, and accumulating capital. The 
third and last period of life is spent as an old person in retirement, living off 
support received from each of one’s offspring and from the sale of accumulated 50  T. N. Srinivasan 
capital. All members of each generation are identical in their preferences de- 
fined over their consumption in their working and retired periods. Thus, in this 
model the only reason that an  individual would want to have  a child is the 
support the child will provide during the individual’s retired life. Production 
(of a single commodity which can be consumed or accumulated) is organized 
in firms which buy capital from the retired and hire the young as workers. 
Markets for product, labor, and capital are assumed to be competitive. 
Formally, a typical individual of the generation which is young in period t 
has n, children (reproduction is by parthenogenesis!), consumes c: and c;+~  in 
periods t and t + 1, and saves s, in period t. She supplies one unit of  labor for 
wage employment. Her income from wage labor while young in period t is w,, 
and that is her only income in that period. A proportion a  of this wage income 
is given to her parents as old age support. While old in period t + 1, she sells 
her accumulated saving to firms and receives from each of  her offspring the 
proportion a  of his or her wage income, She enjoys a utility U(ci,  ci,,)  from 
consumption. Thus her choice problem can be stated as 
(9) 
where Of is the output cost of rearing a child until young. 
(12) 
(1 3) 
Profit maximization of the producer yields 
W,+I  = A(4+*)V(k+J  -  K,+Lf’(k+I)l? 
1 + r,,,  = A(L,+l).f’(k+l)? 
wheref(k) = F(k, 1) (since F(K, L)  is assumed to be homogeneous of degree 
one) and 1 + r, is the price of  capital in period t. In equilibrium, the private 
rates of return from investing in children and physical capital are equal so that 
arbitrage opportunities are ruled out. This implies that 
Plugging equations (12) and (13) in equation (14), we get an implicit equation 
linking  k,,,,  Of, and  a.  It  can  be  shown that,  under  standard neoclassical 
assumptions on  the production function, we  can solve for k,,,  as a function 
*(Or/cx).  Since k,+, = s,/n,  (given the assumption that capital depreciates fully 
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c: = (1 -  a)w, -  S, and c:,]  = (1 + r,+,)S,,  where S, = [8, + 'P(O,/a)]n,.  S, 
can be thought of as total savings. 
Denote the solution of  the above utility maximization problem by  S, = 
H(w,, 1 + r,+J The solutions for n, and s, can be expressed as 
Equation (15) determines the dynamics of  the system. First consider the 
simplest case in which the child-rearing cost 8, = 8, for all t 2  0. It is clear 
that k,+, = k*, defined by  k*  = +(Oh),  for all t 2 1 in this case. Assuming 
further that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas, i.e., U = a log c: + (1 -  a) 
log c:+,,  we have H(w,,  1 + r,+,)  = (1 -  a)w,.  Equation (15) now yields 
or 
where X = [(l -  a)(l -  a>w*]/(8  + k*). From equation (S), one notes that 
per capita income is given by y, =  A(L,>f(k*).  Thus, the dynamics of population 
long-run behavior of per capita income hinge on the function A&).  It should 
be recalled that, although the fertility decisions of individuals determine L, and 
hence A&),  this is an unperceived externality. A few possibilities are depicted 
in figures 2.U-2.2C. 
Suppose A(L,) is such that G(L,)  is a concave function which is zero at L, = 
0 and satisfies the Inada condition. Then, in the long run, the population will 
be stationary and per capita income will be constant as in the standard neoclas- 
sical growth model. This is shown in figure 2.2A.  Now  suppose that G(L,) is 
concave but G'(L,) is bounded away from one. In this case, we have long-run 
growth in L, and hence in per capita income. This is shown in figure 2.2B. 
Suppose now that A(LJ is a logistic function with a positive asymptote, such 
as A(L) = ye+-"*,  for L 2 0. It can be shown (Raut and Srinivasan 1991) that 
there are multiple steady states. Figure 2.2C shows a case of two steady states 
L*  and L**. G(L)  reaches its maximum at L. The properties of these steady 
states depend on the parameter values. If the maximum  is to the right of L**, 
then L** is locally stable and there exists a neighborhood around L** within 
which the system is monotonic. On the other hand, if E is to the left of L**, as 
in figure 2.2C, there can be a nongeneric set of parameter values for which the 
system will exhibit endogenous fluctuations that can be damped, exploding, or 
even chaotic. However, since a  can affect A,  if  a  is partly influenced by  the 
government through social security schemes, the government can shift  to the 
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Fig. 2.2  A: Stationary population and income. B: Sustained growth in 
population and income. C:  Phase diagram of G(L,). 53  Long-Run Growth Theories and Empirics: Anything New? 
More general childbearing costs are considered by  Raut  and Srinivasan 
(1991, sec. 4a), involving parent’s time and depending on the rate of technolog- 
ical change. Naturally these lead to more complicated dynamical problems. 
They show that there can be superexponential growth in per capita income in 
the long run in  the case of  some specific functional forms for general costs 
of childbearing. 
To  sum up this section, the starting point of  some, though not all, of  the 
recent contributions to growth theory is a misleading characterization of neo- 
classical growth theory of the 1960s and earlier as implying that a steady state 
growth path always exists along which output grows at a rate equal to the exog- 
enously specified rate of growth of the labor force in efficiency units. Thus, in 
the absence of  labor-augmenting technical progress, per capita income does 
not grow along the steady state path. Policies that affect savings (investment) 
rates have only transient effects on the growth rate of per capita output, though 
its steady state level is affected. Even a cursory reading of  the literature is 
enough to convince a reader that neoclassical growth theorists were fully aware 
that a steady state need not exist and that per capita output can grow indefi- 
nitely even in the absence of technical progress, provided the marginal product 
of capital is bounded away from zero by  a sufficiently high positive number. 
Moreover, they showed that, once one departs from the assumption that the 
marginal product of capital monotonically declines to zero as the capital-labor 
ratio increases indefinitely, multiple steady state growth paths (only some of 
which are stable) are likely and that the steady state to which a transition path 
converges will depend on initial conditions. Attempts at endogenizing techni- 
cal progress were also made by theorists of the era. 
It was argued above that the perceived problems of neoclassical growth the- 
ory are not inherent features of all the growth models of  the era but only of 
those which assumed the marginal product of capital (or more generally of any 
reproducible factor) diminishes to zero as the input of capital (or that factor) 
is increased indefinitely relative to other inputs. Instead of directly relaxing 
this assumption about production technology, the “new” growth theorists in 
effect make assumptions that are analogous to assuming that the marginal 
product of  capital is bounded away from zero. In  some of the models this is 
achieved by introducing a factor other than physical capital (e.g., human capi- 
tal, or stock of knowledge) which is not subject to inexorable returns. In doing 
so, some authors end up with an aggregate production function that exhibits 
increasing scale economies. Unsurprisingly, in such models multiple equilibria 
are possible. 
The Raut-Srinivasan (1 99 1) model takes a different approach to endogeniz- 
ing technical progress and growth by  assuming fertility and savings to be en- 
dogenous and the size of the total population to have an external effect (of a 
Hicks-neutral type) either through the negative influence of congestion or the 
positive stimulation of  faster innovation. This model generates a rich set of 54  T. N. Srinivasan 
growth paths for per capita income and consumption, some of which do not 
converge to a steady state and are even chaotic. 
2.3  Empirics of Growth 
The recent revival in theories of long-run growth has also revived its empiri- 
cal analysis. Of  course, such analysis has a long history going back to the 
pioneering works of Simon Kuznets (1966), Abramowitz (1956), and Denison 
(1962). Solow himself followed his justly celebrated article (Solow 1956) on 
the theory of growth with an almost equally celebrated empirical analysis (So- 
low  1957) of  long-run growth in the United States. The early pioneers and 
Solow were interested in growth accounting, i.e., apportioning the observed 
long-run growth in real output between the growth of factor inputs on the one 
hand and the growth of  total factor productivity on the other. Some recent 
studies (Benhabib and Jovanovic 1991; Boskin and Lau 1992a, 1992b; Jorgen- 
son 1990; Kim and Lau  1992a, 1992b, 1992c) are in the growth accounting 
tradition. Many  of  the other recent empirical studies (Baumol 1986; Barro 
1989; Barro and  Sala-&Martin 1992; DeLong  1988; Dowrick and Nguyen 
1989; Jorgenson 1990; Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992) attempt to test an as- 
pect of neoclassical growth theory, namely, convergence of the economy to the 
steady state. 
The strong version of the convergence hypothesis asserts that, if all econo- 
mies had access to the same aggregate production function exhibiting constant 
returns to scale in capital and effective labor inputs, experienced the same rate 
of  growth of  labor force and labor-augmenting technical progress, and saved 
and invested the same share of  output, they would all converge to the same 
steady state at which output and capital would grow at the same rate as effec- 
tive  labor, i.e.,  the  sum of  the rates  of  growth of  labor force and  labor- 
augmenting technical progress.  The weak version, known as “conditional” 
convergence, allows for possible differences in  steady state levels of  output 
across economies due to differences in savings rates and initial level of labor- 
augmenting technical progress functions. The publication by  Summers and 
Heston (1988,1991) of purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted data for a large 
number of  countries for the period since 1960 enabled tests of  a variety of 
convergence hypotheses. 
Jorgenson (1990) commemorated 50 years of research on economic mea- 
surement by contributing to the theme of economic growth and its sources. He 
points out that until recently “the study of  sources of economic growth has 
been based on the notion of an aggregate production function [which makes] 
it possible to summarize a welter of detailed information within a single over- 
arching framework. . . .  At the same time the concept of an aggregate produc- 
tion function is highly problematical, requiring very stringent assumptions on 
production patterns at the level of individual sectors of the economy” (1990, 
19). In contrast to Solow (1957), Jorgenson finds that growth of inputs, rather 55  Long-Run Growth Theories and Empirics: Anything New? 
than growth in total factor productivity, was the driving force behind the expan- 
sion of  the U.S.  economy between  1947 and  1985. In  the growth of  value 
added at 3.28 percent per year on the average during this period, growth of 
capital inputs accounted for 44 percent, labor inputs 34 percent, and productiv- 
ity accounted for the least, namely, 22 percent. The difference between follow- 
ers of Solow (1957) and of Jorgenson arises from the fact that Jorgenson care- 
fully distinguishes the separate contributions of capital and labor quality from 
the contributions of  capital stock and hours worked. This distinction is ex- 
tremely important since both capital and labor inputs are very heterogeneous. 
Solow (1957) and others following him do not allow for quality differences in 
their measurement of quantity of inputs. Since Jorgenson’s assumptions about 
the  aggregate production  function  are  strictly  neoclassical  (in  particular, 
returns to scale are assumed to be constant and externalities are virtually ab- 
sent), the fact that he is able to explain most of  the observed growth in the 
United States by growth of inputs appropriately measured suggests that, if his 
framework is accepted, the analytical innovations of recent growth theory need 
not be invoked to explain growth performance! 
Unfortunately, it is not simple to decide whether Jorgenson’s framework or 
other frameworks that maintain neoclassical assumptions are indeed the appro- 
priate ones. After reviewing the conventional methodology of the measurement 
of  technical progress and growth accounting and the results of the growth- 
accounting exercises of various authors, Boskin and Lau point to two major 
pitfalls of  maintaining the traditional assumptions of  constant returns to 
scale, neutrality of technical progress and profit maximization with competi- 
tive output and input markets in the measurement of technical progress and 
growth accounting. First, . . .  for an  economy in which aggregate real output 
and inputs are all growing over time, it is in general difficult to identify 
separately the effects of returns to scale and technical progress-either  one 
can be used as a substitute explanation for the other. Thus, to the extent that 
there are increasing returns to scale, maintaining the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale results in an  over estimate of technical progress; and to the 
extent there are decreasing returns to scale, maintaining the hypothesis re- 
sults in an underestimate. . . .  A further implication (of maintaining constant 
returns to scale when there are increasing returns to scale) is that the contri- 
butions of  the capital and labor inputs to economic growth will also be 
underestimated. The reverse is true if there are decreasing returns to scale. 
Second, . . .  if technical progress is non-neutral, then the rate of technical 
progress at time t will vary depending on the quantities of capital and labor 
inputs at time r.  Moreover, technical progress by  many periods cannot be 
expressed simply as a cumulative sum of  the technical progress that has 
occurred over the individual periods, nor can it be expressed simply as an 
average (Boskin and Lau 1992a, 24). 
In a series of  papers, Boskin and Lau (1992a, 1992b) and Kim and Lau 
(1992a, 1992b, 1992c) apply “a new framework for analysis of  productivity 
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gate meta-production  function, that does not require the traditionally main- 
tained assumption. . . . This new approach enables the separate identification 
of not only the degree of returns to scale and the rate of technical progress . . . 
but also their biases, if any” (Boskin and Lau 1992a, 33). 
Their application (Boskin and Lau  1992b) to the Group of  Five countries 
(France, West  Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 
shows that, while the assumption that all countries have the same underlying 
meta-production  function of  the transcendental logarithmic form cannot be 
rejected, traditional growth-accounting assumptions are all rejected. Returns 
to scale are found to be sharply diminishing, and technical progress may be 
represented as purely capital augmenting and capital saving rather than labor 
saving. Their growth-accounting  exercise leads them to conclude that technical 
progress is found to be the most important source of  growth, accounting for 
more than 45  percent, followed by  growth of  capital input. Kim and Lau 
(1992~)  apply the same approach to nine countries including the Group of Five 
and the four East Asian newly industrialized countries (N1Cs)-Hong  Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Interestingly, they find that the hypothe- 
sis of a single meta-production  function applying to all nine countries cannot 
be rejected. While they reaffirm the findings of Boskin and Lau that technical 
progress can be represented as purely capital augmenting, they cannot reject 
the hypothesis that there has been no technical progress in the NICs, with more 
than 80 percent of their economic growth being explained by capital accumu- 
lation. 
It has long been argued (Mahalanobis 1955; Rosenberg 1963) that the cost 
of equipment (and alternatively investment in equipment) might have an im- 
portant role to play in the growth process. Indeed, in arguing for the establish- 
ment of a domestic heavy machinery industry, Mahalanobis insisted that “for 
rapid industrialization of an under-developed country it would be desirable to 
keep the cost of capital goods as low as possible. The further removed the type 
of capital goods under consideration is from the production of final consumer 
goods the greater is the need of keeping the price low. Heavy machinery which 
would manufacture machinery to produce investment goods is the furthest re- 
moved from the consumption end” (Mahalanobis 1955,51). 
Interestingly enough, some economic historians have attributed the Western 
success in industrialization to the development of heavy industries, particularly 
those producing machine tools and capital goods. In words that echo Mahala- 
nobis’s, quoted above, Nathan Rosenberg asserts that “a major handicap of 
underdeveloped countries, then, is located in their inability to produce invest- 
ment goods at prices sufficiently low to assure a reasonable rate of return on 
prospective investments. Reasoning symmetrically, of the most significant pro- 
pelling forces in the growth of  currently high-income countries has been the 
technological dynamism of their capital goods industries which has maintained 
the marginal efficiency of capital at a high level” (Rosenberg 1963,226). 
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ment in equipment explained a significant part of the variations in economic 
growth in countries. Kim and Lau (1992b) test a version of a related hypothe- 
sis, namely, that technical progress is embodied in new investments so that it 
can affect the output of  an economy only through the form of  new  capital 
goods. They found, using an aggregate meta-production  model incorporating 
vintage effects, that the hypothesis of no embodied technical progress can be 
rejected for the Group of Five countries, with the vintage effect; namely, the 
productivity of new equipment relative to that in the preceding period is higher 
by 4 to 5 percent. The contribution of embodied technical progress to growth 
was found to range from 55 percent for Japan to 70 percent for the other four 
countries. 
The studies by Lau and his coauthors, on the one hand, restore a significant 
role for productivity growth in explaining aggregate growth, but on the other, 
they find little productivity growth in MCs. This creates a problem for those 
who attribute the spectacular  growth of NICs to the dynamic productivity gains 
arising from their outward orientation! 
The time-series-cum-cross-section  analyses of growth by Jorgenson and by 
Lau and his coauthors have the virtue that the econometric  model they estimate 
is derived from a well-specified theory and, further, that the possibility of test- 
ing the specification is also present. Unfortunately,  many recent cross-sectional 
analyses of  growth using “data” from literally a hundred or more countries 
(e.g., Barro and Lee 1994 include 133 countries in growth-rate regressions) 
are rarely based on a well-specified theoretical model. For example, inclusion 
of  variables such as school attainment of  the population or some measure of 
educational stock is motivated merely by  appeals to the role of human capital 
in growth. However, without an analytical framework that formalizes the pro- 
cess of human capital accumulation (e.g., learning by doing) and how it relates 
to aggregate growth in different economies, it is impossible to infer anything 
meaningful from the significant statistical significance (or lack thereof) of the 
estimated parameter associated with the human capital variable. 
Indeed, as Lucas (1993) points out in his extremely stimulating paper, “es- 
tablishing the importance of  learning by  doing for productivity growth on a 
specific production process is very different from establishing its importance 
for an entire economy as a whole, or even an entire sector” (252-53). In at- 
tempting to explain episodes of sustained and rapid growth over nearly three 
decades, as in East Asian economies, Lucas correctly suggests that one needs 
a theory that incorporates the possibility of rapid growth episodes, but that at 
the same time does not imply their occurrence as a simple consequence of 
the relative backwardness of  the countries experiencing them. In his view, a 
successful theory should be as consistent with the experience of Korea, with 
its rapid growth since the mid-l960s, as with that of  the Philippines, which 
experienced no such growth, although both economies started from roughly 
similar situations. Lucas finds that models of  technical learning with spillover 
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(1991) constitute such a theory. Whether or not this is the case, the cross- 
sectional growth analysts, by the very fact of their estimating the same model 
using data from many countries, assume that the theory, if any, that is implicit 
in the estimated model is applicable to all of them! For example, Mankiw et 
al. (1992) go as far as to assume that the sum of the rates of labor-augmenting 
technical progress and depreciation of capital are the same (i.e., 5 percent per 
year) across 98 countries ranging from Angola to Zimbabwe and over time, 
between 1960 and 1985! 
In a series of papers Levine and Renelt (  199  1, 1992) and Levine and Zervos 
(1993a, 1993b)  have thoroughly reviewed the methodological, conceptual, and 
statistical problems of, as well as isolated what they deem “robust” findings 
from, cross-country studies. The data and measurement problems are far more 
serious than they realize. For example, in the cross-country study of growth by 
Barro and Lee (1994) the variables considered include school attainment, life 
expectancy at birth, and infant mortality in  1965, 1975, and  1985. In  Sen’s 
(1993) study of “regress,” the change in the rate of mortality of children under 
five years during 1965-91 is an important indicator. Unfortunately, the authors 
do not recognize that the data they use for many developing countries are at 
best projections and certainly not actual observations. According to the United 
Nations (1991), relatively reliable and recent (i.e., a reference period of  1980 
or later) data for estimating life expectancy at birth (respectively, infant mortal- 
ity) are not available for as many as  87 (respectively, 65) out of  177 less- 
developed countries, many of which are included in the Barro and Lee (1994) 
study! The same source points out that reliable data on levels of mortality un- 
der age five are not available for 29 countries, and available data related to a 
period prior to 1980 for as many as 54 out of the same 117 countries. UNESCO 
(1991) finds that, out of  a total of  145 countries (including developed coun- 
tries), for 19 no data exist on adult literacy since 1970 and for 41 the latest 
data relate to a year in the decade 1970-79! 
Many of the cross-country studies use GDP data based on the PPP exchange 
rate, put together by  Summers and Heston (1988, 1991). Although Summers 
and Heston are careful to list the problems with their data, including in particu- 
lar identifying commodities that are close to being identical in different coun- 
tries so that they can be priced out using a common set of prices, users pay 
scant attention to their warnings (see the appendix). It is one thing to adjust 
for international differences in price structures as Summers and Heston do. 
But what they do not adjust for, and what in many cases is more serious, are 
biases in measurement of quantities (Srinivasan 1993b). Indeed Summers and 
Heston (1991) themselves assign a quality rating of D+ or D to the data of 66 
out of  their 138 countries, most of which are less-developed countries, 37 of 
them African countries. Data on investment are particularly unreliable. Biases, 
as well as measurement errors, might vary in an unknown fashion over time 
and  across countries, and  obviously such variations have  implications for 
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Levine and Renelt (1992) and Levine and Zervos (1993b) use the methodol- 
ogy of extreme-bound analysis pioneered by Edward Leamer for distinguish- 
ing “robust” from “fragile” relationships between policy and outcome indica- 
tors.  In  this  methodology,  in  a  cross-country regression,  a  set  of  basic 
explanatory variables,  Z, is always included and Z is a set of up to three explana- 
tory variables chosen from a pool of policy indicators. M is the policy indicator 
of particular interest. If the coefficient of  M in the regression is consistently 
significant and of the same sign as the set of 2 variables is varied over the pool 
of policy indicators, then the relationship between the dependent variable and 
policy indicator M is deemed “robust,” otherwise it is “fragile.” The motivation 
for this is the finding in Levine and Renelt (1992) that small changes in the 
explanatory variables produce different conclusions about the relationship be- 
tween individual policies and growth outcomes in cross-country studies. While 
the motivation is admirable and the procedure certainly interesting, there are 
conceptual problems with the procedure. In principle, the use of different sets 
of variables to explain the same dependent variable imply different “models” 
of growth. As such, the sign, as well as the statistical significance, of the coef- 
ficient of a given variable M is thus model specific. Should the sign or signifi- 
cance  change  as  “models”  are  changed,  does  it  imply  that  the  relation- 
ship between M  and the dependent variable should be viewed as fragile? I 
think not: The reason is that the sign itself may be specific to the model, and 
certainly the test of significance is model specific. For example, the same pol- 
icy variable M may be positively related to growth in one model or theory of 
growth as represented by the other variables included, and negatively related 
in another. This problem does not disappear, even if  the policy variables in- 
cluded in the pool are of the same “genre” (i.e., trade policy, financial policy, 
etc.) as M. 
It is worth recognizing that policy indicators as well as some of the other 
variables often included in cross-country regressions are endogenous. In stud- 
ies involving cross sections repeated over time, country-specific effects (fixed 
or random) are sometimes included. Since the other explanatory variables (par- 
ticularly policy variables) might plausibly correlate with country-specific ef- 
fects  as  Deaton  (1995) points  out,  the  random  effects  estimator will  be 
inconsistent. On the other hand, if  these effects are treated asfied,  remov- 
ing fixed effects by  differencing introduces a correlation between the dis- 
turbance term  in  the  differenced regression and  its  explanatory variables, 
if the latter include lagged values of the dependent variable. If  the number of 
time periods  over  which  the  cross  sections are repeated  is  small relative 
to the number of  countries included in  each cross section, the fixed effect 
estimate will also be  inconsistent. Not  all analysts  address such problems 
by the use of  appropriate econometric techniques, such as the use of  instru- 
mental variables. Even those who do rarely report how good the instruments 
actually used were and how robust the results were to changes in the instru- 
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2.4  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The purpose of the cross-country regression analysis is not only to “explain” 
the growth process and its determinants but also presumably to derive policy 
lessons. In an earlier set of studies, Chenery (1960) and Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975, 1989) suggested that their cross-country regression “can be thought of 
as reduced forms of a more detailed general equilibrium system” (Chenery and 
Syrquin 1975, 10) and viewed their analysis as leading “to the identification 
of  three main patterns of resource allocation identified .  .  . as: large country, 
balanced allocation; small country, primary specialization; small country, in- 
dustry specialization”  (1975, 4). In inferring a typology of development pat- 
terns from a policy perspective, these authors were eclectic since they were 
aware that causal interpretation of  reduced-form relationships is hazardous. 
Their inferences were based on comparing countries that are following similar 
development patterns and the policies chosen by countries under similar condi- 
tions. 
There can be no doubt that the recent contributions to the theory and empiri- 
cal analysis of the process of growth have substantially increased our knowl- 
edge about the  analytics of  growth and the potential role of  human capital 
accumulation, investment in research  and development, international trade, 
and externalities and scale economies (arising in part from nonrivalry and non- 
excludability in use of knowledge) in the growth process. Whether public pol- 
icy intervention in the economy is called for from the perspective of influenc- 
ing the growth process and, if  so, what the character of  such intervention 
should be are issues on which recent work has provided some valuable in- 
sights; but understandably, no conclusive answers have yet emerged. For ex- 
ample, if the contribution of  endogenous factor accumulation is small and an 
overwhelming share of  observed growth is due to exogenous technical prog- 
ress, as in the Solow (1957) story of  U.S. growth, there is little that public 
policy could do to affect the growth process significantly. In contrast, if most 
of growth could be attributed to factor accumulation (physical and human), as 
in Jorgenson (1990), then public policy intervention could influence growth. 
This is not to say either that the U.S. experience is likely to be repeated in the 
developing world or that public policy intervention is desirable from a wel- 
fare perspective. 
To take another example, it is undeniable that the East Asian economies of 
Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have not only grown substantially 
faster than almost all other developing countries over the three decades since 
1960, but also shown rapid and sustained growth that is historically unprece- 
dented. Whether it is a miracle, as a recent study (World Bank 1993) and Lucas 
(1993) deem it, is arguable. All four countries had two things in common in 
their policy, namely, their emphasis on human capital and on outward orienta- 
tion, while they differed in the extent of government intervention in markets, 
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The nature of their regimes differed as well, although all were authoritarian to 
a considerable extent. Analogous to the Solow-Jorgenson differences in ac- 
counting for U.S. growth, in the case of East Asia some find substantial contri- 
bution of  total factor productivity growth to total growth, whereas Kim and 
Lau (1992~)  and Young (1993) find factor accumulation (human and physical 
capital) accounting for most of their growth. To what extent their outward ori- 
entation and public policy interventions contributed to their unprecedented 
growth is a matter of intensive debate as well, with some (e.g., Anderson 1989) 
emphasizing that interventions in the economy succeeded only where they met 
the test of competitiveness in world markets and the World Bank (1993) being 
in the middle! 
Cross-country regressions testing some version or the other of the conver- 
gence hypothesis relating to aggregate growth, whatever other insights they 
have yielded about the growth process, by their very nature have little to say 
about the microeconomic forces that together generate the aggregate outcome. 
Here again the observations of Lucas are pertinent: 
I do not intend these conjectures about the implications of a learning spill- 
over technology for small countries facing given world prices to be a substi- 
tute for the actual construction of such a theory.. . . What is the nature of 
human capital accumulation decision problems faced by workers, capitalists 
and managers? What are the external consequences of the decisions they 
take? The purpose cited here considers a variety of possible assumptions on 
these economic issues, but it must be said that little is known, and without 
such knowledge there is little we can say about the way policies that affect 
incentives can be expected to influence economic growth (Lucas 1993,270). 
Appendix 
The Summers-Heston Data 
There are two extrapolations involved in the Summers-Heston data: the first 
from benchmark countries (which varied from 16 in 1970 to 56 in 1985) to 
other countries for the benchmark year, and the second, from benchmark years 
(1970,1975,1980, and 1985) to other years in the period 1960-85  (Summers 
and Heston 1991, app. A-2). 
For the first, they use “capital city price surveys conducted around the world 
by the United Nations International Civil Service Commission, a British firm 
serving an association of international businesses, and the U.S. State Depart- 
ment” (1991, 341). While recognizing that “the price indexes appropriate for 
this very  special population-high-income  non-nationals, living usually in 
capital cities-does  not properly reflect all the prices in the country, of course, 
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vidual goods in the countries for the nationals” (341), they nonetheless found 
a structural  relationship “in the benchmark country’s PPP and its postallowance 
PPP” and exploited it “to estimate for the non-benchmark countries missing 
PPP’s from their post allowance PPP’s” (342). 
For the second, they go from a benchmark year, say 1985, to other years “by 
applying the relevant growth rates from the constant-price national accounts 
series-the  values for the year of interest divided by  the corresponding 1985 
ones-to  the 1985 number” (343). As is well known, using one set of prices 
as opposed to another in appraising growth performance can lead to biases. 
For example, if the domestic price structure deviates significantly from world 
prices (assumed to be constant over time for simplicity) because of  distor- 
tionary nonoptimal tariff policies, the production possibility frontier could un- 
ambiguously shift outward and real GDP at domestic prices could show growth 
from one period to the next, while the same outputs evaluated at world prices, 
show a decline (Bhagwati and Hansen 1973). In any case, Summers and Hes- 
ton correctly caution that “growth rates based on international prices can differ 
significantly from those based on national prices, but when they do, it is nearly 
always the case that relative prices within the countries have changed substan- 
tially over the period” (1991,361). I might add that rapid development over an 
extended period will  almost always involve substantial changes in  relative 
prices, particularly of the basket of internationally  traded goods relative to non- 
traded goods. 
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Comment  Paul M. Romer 
Research on economic growth alternates between periods of boom and bust. 
These fluctuations disrupt the cumulative nature of scientific inquiry. When a 
topic like growth goes out of  fashion, much of  what is known in the area is 
not transmitted to students. Then when activity picks up, a new generation of 
researchers wastes time rediscovering results that have previously been estab- 
lished. 
This inefficiency can be reduced if there are economists who can span more 
than one boom in research on growth. The profession is fortunate to have such 
a scholar in T. N. Srinivasan. He made important contributions to the theory of 
growth during the 1960s. The work with Lakshmi Raut described here shows 
that he is doing so once again in the 1990s. This particular paper uses the 
experience acquired in the first round to comment on recent developments in 
growth theory. Any economist who was not active in growth theory during the 
1950s and 1960s can learn from what he has to say. 
Srinivasan makes two general points. As the title suggests, one is about the- 
ory and the other is about empirics. The warning about the empirical work is 
easy to state and hard to dispute: The cross-country data on aggregate measures 
such as growth rates, literacy rates, and life expectancy suffer from many defi- 
ciencies. 
Srinivasan would no doubt agree that there is something to be learned from 
cross-country data. For example, when I was a graduate student, I was taught 
that there was no correlation in the data between aggregate rates of investment 
and the rate of growth of income per capita. Now we know that this correlation 
is quite strong and survives all attempts to hold constant the effects of other 
variables. Of  course, correlation does not resolve questions about causality. 
Many different theories of growth are consistent with this new addition to our 
list of stylized facts about growth. But if one is going to use stylized facts, it 
is surely better to rely on ones that are true instead of ones that are false. 
That being said, Srinivasan is correct in arguing that some of the claims 
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derived from an analysis of  the cross-country data are too strong. There is 
important measurement error in the underlying data. Empirical analyses would 
be more useful if they took explicit account of this fact. 
I will direct the balance of my comments to the theoretical point in this 
paper. It can be summarized as follows. All models that exhibit growth at a 
constant exponential rate contain an equation of the form 
dX 
-  = -X(t). 
dt 
All the disagreement is about the expression that fills in the blank and the name 
that is attached to the variable X. This equation, or the variable X itself, is often 
given the colorful label “the engine of  growth.” When the theory fills in the 
blank with an expression that remains constant over time, X(t)  grows at a con- 
stant exponential rate. True to its name as an engine, X(t)  pulls the rest of the 
economy along with it. 
In  a model with exogenous technological change, X(t) is the level of  the 
technology at date t  and  a  constant-the  rate of  exogenous technological 
change-fills  in the blank. Linear growth models treat X as a capital good (or 
a vector of capital goods) and fill in the blank with an expression that depends 
on the savings or investment rate. Models based on human capital accumula- 
tion give a corresponding label to X  and fill in the blank with an expression 
that depends on investment in schooling or on-the-job training. Models of in- 
tentional research and development interpret X as a measure of technology and 
fill in the blank with an expression that depends on research effort. 
In this context, the difference between endogenous and exogenous growth 
models is easy to describe. Exogenous growth models fill in the blank with a 
constant that is a fundamental parameter of the economy. Endogenous growth 
models fill it in with an expression that is a function of other basic parameters 
of the model, including parameters that can be changed by policymakers. 
Srinivasan’s theoretical point is that there is nothing new about endogenous 
growth models per se. For decades, there have been models that fill in the blank 
with an expression that depends on preferences and policy variables. If the 
construction of  an endogenous growth model were the only goal of  growth 
theory, then we  could have stopped after John von  Neumann presented his 
linear growth model at a seminar in Princeton in 1932.’ 
Srinivasan reproaches recent growth theorists for claiming that the construc- 
tion of  an endogenous growth rate is an important research achievement. If 
there are any growth theorists still making this claim, they deserve the rebuke. 
1. The paper was not published in German until 1938, when Karl Menger invited von Neumann 
to  submit it to a collection of papers. It  was not published in English until  1945 (von Neumann 
1945). One suspects that von Neumann felt that a problem that, from a mathematical point of view, 
could be reduced to eq. (1) was too trivial to bother submitting for publication. 68  T. N. Srinivasan 
Doing  so  suggests that  our  methodological preferences should be  lexico- 
graphic; any endogenous growth model should dominate an exogenous growth 
model. In fact, the challenge for growth theory is not to produce a model with 
this particular property-that  policy can influence the growth rate. The funda- 
mental goal must be to formulate new models that are right, or at least closer 
to being right, than existing models. 
I can clearly remember the classroom interaction that first pushed me in the 
direction of work on economic growth. It was not an exogenous growth model 
that I objected to, but an endogenous growth model. The professor had just 
finished presenting the von Neumann model. I interjected that it was obviously 
a stupid model of growth. Pressed to give a somewhat more articulate descrip- 
tion of the model’s failings, I set to work on a project that has kept me busy 
for 15 years. 
In retrospect, it is clear that I did not appreciate the subtlety of  von Neu- 
mann’s early contribution to general equilibrium theory. (It is also clear that I 
was not very tactful.) But all my subsequent work persuades me that my harsh 
judgment of the model as a model of growth was correct. In the von Neumann 
model, a vector of goods X can produce a new  vector of goods X‘ = ax  for 
some number a > 1. In place of a discussion of new products, new processes, 
universities, private research labs, patent law, scientific inquiry-all  the things 
that seemed to me then and still seem to me now to be at the heart of economic 
growth-the  model blithely offers up an attractive mathematical assumption 
that cannot be given any meaningful interpretation. 
It is this kind of assumption, one that violates the most obvious facts about 
the world, that leaves economists open to ridicule. If  economists start from 
assumptions about production that violate physical laws about the conservation 
of mass-that  let goods reproduce like rabbits with an infinite food supply- 
why should anyone take what we say seriously? It was this kind of analysis by 
mainstream economists that provoked the equally misleading analysis of the 
environmental alarmists of the 1970s. They predicted that we were on the verge 
of  economic catastrophe because our food supply (i.e., our natural resources) 
was running out. 
By now it should be beyond dispute that economic growth takes place be- 
cause people find more valuable ways to make use of the raw materials that 
have always been available to us in the crust of the earth and in the atmosphere. 
We  have a standard of living that is higher than that of our grandparents, not 
because we have more stuff-more  mass-but  because we have learned to do 
interesting things like make memory chips from existing stuff like silicon. 
When we rearrange the silicon by growing it in a crystal and mixing it with a 
few other elements, we make it much more valuable. 
Once one starts to think this way, it is clear that a neoclassical model that 
allows for technological progress is a significant improvement over a linear 
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quantities of these same goods. In the long run, the fundamental driving force 
in our economy is change in what we know, and the neoclassical model high- 
lights a crucial mathematical implication of  treating knowledge as an eco- 
nomic good. When we use an expression of the form Y = AF(K, L) or Y = 
F(K, BL) and admit that F is a constant-returns-to-scale  production function, 
we implicitly acknowledge that aggregate output is not a concave function of 
K, L, and A or B. 
So if one takes the economics of discovery, innovation, and invention seri- 
ously, a neoclassical model with technological change is clearly to be preferred 
to a model with a fixed set of  goods that replicate like rabbits. This is true 
despite the fact that the neoclassical model makes the rate of growth exogenous 
and the linear model makes it endogenous. The neoclassical model gets im- 
portant parts of the economics of  growth right in a way that the linear model 
does not. 
But as anyone with any sense will admit, the neoclassical model with exoge- 
nous technological change is not the end of the story. The next step is to con- 
struct models that can explain where technological change comes from and 
explore the economic implications of the nonconvexity that the neoclassical 
model exhibits and then ignores. 
It is true that some recent models of growth do little more than revive the 
von Neumann model and label one of the capital stocks human capital. This is 
not very helpful. It is these models that Srinivasan justifiably criticizes. But 
much of the recent work has been concerned with a serious attempt to charac- 
terize the economics of processes like learning, discovery, and the diffusion 
of knowledge. 
The goods in the von  Neumann model are entirely conventional. Recent 
models recognize that knowledge or discoveries or ideas are goods that differ 
from conventional goods in two very important ways. First, it is difficult to 
establish property rights over these goods-hence  the emphasis on spillovers 
and external effects. Second, in the language of public finance, these goods are 
also nonrival goods, so they are intrinsically associated with nonconvexities. 
We  have not yet reached consensus about how to write down a model that 
blends elements like learning by doing, knowledge spillovers, patents, explicit 
research and development, and government support for science. But we are 
once again making a serious effort toward reaching this goal. 
So the answer to the question posed in the title of  Srinivasan’s paper is un- 
ambiguously yes. There is something new in long-run growth theory. As he 
suggests, it does not lie merely in the construction of endogenous growth mod- 
els. Instead, it comes from efforts to understand ideas and knowledge. Micro- 
economists have known for some time that the economics of ideas and knowl- 
edge differs in important ways from the familiar economics of objects. What 
growth theory has established is that these differences can be of decisive im- 
portance for an analysis of the economy as a whole. We  now  know that we 70  T.  N. Srinivasan 
cannot keep relegating the issues they raise to the footnotes. We cannot content 
ourselves with bland calls for additional research that we never get around to 
doing. The economics of ideas can change how we think about fundamental 
policy issues in growth and development. A great deal is at stake if we get the 
basic policy answers wrong. 
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